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Abstract—Desktops and laptops can be maliciously exploited
to violate privacy. There are two main types of attack scenarios:
active and passive. In this paper, we consider the passive scenario
where the adversary does not interact actively with the device, but
he is able to eavesdrop on the network traffic of the device from
the network side. Most of the Internet traffic is encrypted and
thus passive attacks are challenging. In this paper, we show that
an external attacker can robustly identify the operating system,
browser and application of HTTP encrypted traffic (HTTPS).
We provide a large dataset of more than 20,000 examples for
this task. We present a comprehensive evaluation of traffic
features including new ones and machine learning algorithms.
We run a comprehensive set of experiments, which shows that
our classification accuracy is 96.06%. Due to the adaptive nature
of the problem, we also investigate the robustness and resilience
to changes of features due to different network conditions (e.g.,
VPN) at test time and the effect of small training set on the
accuracy. We show that our proposed solution is robust to these
changes.
Index Terms—Encrypted Traffic, HTTPS, Operating System,
Browser, Application
I. INTRODUCTION
There are two main types of attack scenarios: active and pas-
sive. Active adversaries try to physically or remotely control
the user device. Passive adversaries may violate the privacy
of the user by sniffing the network traffic of the devices from
the network side. In this work, we consider passive attacks.
If network traffic is not encrypted, the task of a passive
attacker is simple: he can analyze the payload and read the
content of each packet. User activities tracking on the web
was proposed in [1]–[4]. This has been done by analyzing un-
encrypted HTTP requests and responses. A passive adversary
may use this information for understanding user actions and
revealing information regarding personal interests and habits.
However, most of the Internet traffic today is encrypted.
This happens both as users start to gain more familiarity with
privacy threats and as Google encourages all website owners to
switch from HTTP to HTTPS by taking into account whether
sites use secure, encrypted connections, as a signal in their
ranking algorithms [5], [6]. As a result, traditional Deep Packet
Inspection (DPI) methods for information retrieval are not
viable.
Many works have shown that encryption is not sufficient to
protect confidentiality [7]–[46]. Bujlow et al. [30] presented
a survey about popular DPI tools for traffic classification.
Nguyen and Armitage [31] survey machine learning tech-
niques for Internet traffic classification. Moore et al. [36]
used a Naı¨ve Bayes classifier which is a supervised machine
learning approach to classify Internet traffic applications.
Williams et al. [38] conducted a comparison of five machine
learning algorithms that were used to classify Internet traffic
applications. Auld et al. [37] proposed to use a supervised
Bayesian neural network to classify Internet traffic applica-
tions. Alshamarri et al. [39] compared AdaBoost, Support
Vector Machines, Naı¨ve Bayes, RIPPER and C4.5 in order to
classify Skype traffic. Donato et al. [42] presented a method
for application classification called the Traffic Identification
Engine. Niemczyk et al. [41] suggested to divide the session
to time buckets (10 seconds). The features that were used for
each bucket are packet size counts and the time differences
between packets. They found the recognition rate of Skype
was almost perfect. However, their method was not able to
differentiate between browsers and between joint application
and browser usage.
In this paper, our threat model focus on passive attacker
who targeting a specific user. In this case, the attacker is tries
to choose the best vector attack against the user. Therefore,
an adversary can surreptitiously monitor the victims network
traffic to identify what are the operating system, browser and
apps of the user. Based on the vulnerabilities of the tuple,
this will let the attacker to choose the relevant malwares or
Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) method. The attacker can
either sniff the wireless network of the user or can sniff the
user traffic over the ISP network (e.g. government). However,
due to the encryption the attacker may consider to use machine
learning to classify the user operating system, browser and
applications.
Our paper shows that using machine learning with network
traffic analysis can be used to infer private information about
the user computer, i.e., OS, Browser, Application, even though
the traffic is encrypted. Our preliminary research [47] was the
first to propose a robust solution for operating system, browser
and application via encrypted traffic analysis.
Our paper’s main contributions are:
• This is the first work that shows how to identify the
user’s operating system, browser and application from his
HTTPS traffic. Inspired by other works presented above,
we exploit traffic patterns. Additionally, we present new
features that exploit browsers’ bursty behavior and SSL
behavior. Using the baseline features, the accuracy is
293.51% , while using a combination of baseline and new
features achieves accuracy of 96.06%.
• We provide a comprehensive dataset that contains more
than 20,000 labeled sessions. The operating systems in
the dataset are: Windows, Linux-Ubuntu and OSX. The
browsers are: Chrome, Internet Explorer, Firefox and
Safari. The applications are: YouTube, Facebook and
Twitter. The dataset is available for download at [48].
• We show that using small training datasets is possible.
For example, using only 500 examples for training (vs.
the full training dataset of 0.7×20000) we also reach a
reasonable accuracy of 80% for the baseline features and
85% when the new features are added.
• We investigate the robustness of the system to changes
of features due to different network conditions. We show
that our solution is robust to VPN and changes in cipher
suites, where both changes are only on the testing data.
• We investigate the resilience of the system to small
session time. For example, using only the first 10 seconds
of a session for training and testing. We show that
although we use shorter sessions which leads to less meta
data, we reach a reasonable accuracy of 94.2%.
In this paper, we extend our previous work [47] by adding two
machine learning algorithms, investigating the robustness and
resilience of our system and adding possible countermeasures
and limitations discussion.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
section II we revise the state of the art around our research
topic. Section III presents our solution for identifying the
user’s Operating System, Browser and Application. In section
IV we present a through evaluation of our method including
its robustness to changes in network conditions at test time.
In Section V we discuss limitations and possible countermea-
sures. Finally, we conclude and discuss future lines of work
in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORKS
Feature extraction methods for traffic classification include
session duration [39], number of packets in a session [35],
[49], minimum, maximum and average values of inter-arrival
packets time [35], [39], payload size information [35], bit
rate [50], [51], round-trip time [50], packet direction [52],
SSL parameters [46] and server sent bit-rate [53] that has
the advantage of overcoming communication problems such
as packet loss and retransmissions.
Liberatore and Levine [54] showed the effectiveness of two
traffic analysis techniques for the identification of encrypted
HTTP streams. One is based on a naı¨ve Bayes classifier and
one on the Jaccards coefficient similarity measure. They also
proposed several methods for actively countering the tech-
niques. They found these methods to be effective, albeit at the
cost of a significant increase in the size of the traffic stream.
Panchenko et al. [55] showed that a Support Vector Machine
(SVM) classifier is able to correctly identify web pages,
even when the user used both encryption and anonymization
networks such as Tor [56]. Cai et al. [57] presented a web page
fingerprinting attack and showed that it is able to overcome
defenses such as the application-level defenses HTTPOS [58]
and randomized pipelining over Tor.
Exploiting traffic features for gaining information has been
applied not only with the HTTP protocol but also with other
protocols. For example, Song et al. [11] showed that some SSH
variants are not secure. They showed that simple statistical
analysis was able to reveal sensitive information such as login
passwords. Additionally, they showed that advanced statistical
analysis on timing information can reveal what users type.
Another example of a protocol that was shown to be vulnerable
is Voice Over IP (VoIP). Wright et al. [17] showed that it is
possible to identify spoken phrases by using encrypted VoIP
packet length, when variable bit rate (VBR) encoding is used.
They used a Hidden Markov model that achieved more than
90% recall and precision.
Gathering information about the Operating System (OS) or
the browser of the user can be useful too. Passive sniffing
the OS fingerprinting techniques were proposed in [59]–[61].
Husak et al. [62] proposed real-time exact pattern matching for
identification of OS or browser of the user based SSL/TLS
fingerprinting. In this work, the system has to identify the
SSL parameters and are not robust to changes in the SSL
parameters such as cipher suite parameters.
Mobile devices, which have different operating systems
and different application implementation which lead in many
cases to different network behavior, are also a way to gain
information about the user privacy, applications [63]–[69] and
actions [8], [70], [71]. Saltaformaggio et al. [70] presented
NetScope, passive framework for identifying user activities
within the wireless network traffic based on inspecting IP
headers. Conti et al. [7], [8], [71] presented high accuracy
classification frameworks for various user mobile actions and
applications using network features such as size, direction
(incoming/outgoing), and timing.
III. IDENTIFICATION OF USER’S OPERATING SYSTEM,
BROWSER AND APPLICATION
The goal of this paper is to identify user operating sys-
tem, browser and application. To achieve this goal, we use
supervised machine learning techniques. Supervised machine
learning techniques learn a function that given a sample
returns a label. The learning is carried out using a dataset
of labeled samples. In our case, we chose to use sessions as
samples where a session is the tuple <Protocol, IP source,
IP destination, Port source, Port destination> and the label
is the tuple <OS, Browser, Application>. Thus, our task is
inherently a multiclass learning with 30 classes (see Figure 1a
for the labels and their statistics in the dataset).
The rest of this section is organized as follows: In section
III-A we describe how we collected the dataset and the dataset
characteristics. In section III-B we describe and discuss our
feature extraction scheme. Finally, in section III-C we describe
the machine learning methodology we used.
A. Dataset
We used the Selenium web automation tool [72] to develop
crawlers for gathering the dataset. We gathered all the traffic
3that passed through port 443 (TLS/SSL). Finally, we split the
traffic into sessions using SplitCap [73].
We used the crawlers on a standard Internet connection
over various operating systems and various browsers and
combinations thereof. For Facebook, the same account was
used both for sending and receiving posts. For Twitter, we had
one sending account and several receiving accounts (followers)
where they ranged over various operating systems and various
browsers and combinations thereof. Teamviewer’s traffic was
generated by us actively without a crawler.
In addition to our active traffic, we also observed back-
ground traffic that operating systems, browsers and appli-
cations created (Google-Services, Microsoft-Services). Note
that, example for services can be Google Analytics or Mi-
crosoft Live. Dropbox traffic was composed both of active
(no crawler) and background traffic.
Any traffic that we could not identify was labeled as
unidentified. The browser label part of the tuple of stand alone
applications which do not work under a browser (e.g.Dropbox,
Teamviewer) were labeled as Non-Browser.
The dataset was collected over the period of more than two
months in our research lab over diverse connections (wired and
WiFi) and networks conditions (over workdays and weekends
24/7).
Our dataset contains more than 20, 000 sessions. The aver-
age duration of a session is 518 seconds where in average each
session has 520 forward packets (average forward traffic size
is 261 Kbytes) and 637 backward packets (average backward
traffic size is 615 Kbytes). The tuple labels statistics can
be seen in Figure 1a. Operating system, browser, application
statistics can be seen in Figures 1b,1c,1d correspondingly.
B. Feature Extraction
Using raw data in a machine learning method is problematic
as it is non-structured and contains redundant information.
Thus, there is a need to build a structured representation of the
raw data that is informative to the specific problem domain.
Building this representation is called feature extraction [74,
Chapter 5.3].
We extract features from a session of encrypted traffic which
generally relies on SSL/TLS for secure communication. These
protocols are built on top of the TCP/IP suite. The TCP layer
receives encrypted data from the above layer and divides data
into chunks if the packets exceed the Maximum Segment
Size (MSS). Then, for each chunk it adds a TCP header
creating a TCP segment. Each TCP segment is encapsulated
into an Internet Protocol (IP) datagram. As TCP packets do
not include a session identifier, we identify a session using the
tuple <Protocol, IP source, IP destination, Port source, Port
destination>.
A session contains two flows: forward and backward. A flow
is defined as time ordered sequence of TCP packets during a
single TCP session. The forward flow is defined as a time
series bytes transported by incoming packets only, while the
backward flow is defined as a time series bytes transported by
outgoing packets only. We use the forward, backward and their
combination as a representation of a connection. Additionally,
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Fig. 1: Dataset statistics
we also use time series features such as inter arrival time
differentials between different packets on the same flow. Based
on our previous work [75] for classifying video titles, we also
used the bursty behavior of the browsers (peaks) which is
defined as a section of traffic where there is silence before
and after. An example of the bursty behavior of browsers is
depicted in Figure 2. Note that the bursty behavior of browser
traffic was also observed for YouTube traffic in [76], [77].
The feature extraction takes as an input the session network
traffic and extracts features from it. In this paper, we consider
nine sets of features and their combination as can be seen in
Table II.
4# Forward packets
# Forward total bytes
Min forward inter arrival time difference
Max forward inter arrival time difference
Mean forward inter arrival time difference
STD forward inter arrival time difference
Mean forward packets
STD forward packets
# Backward packets
# Backward total bytes
Min backward inter arrival time difference
Max backward inter arrival time difference
Mean backward inter arrival time difference
STD backward inter arrival time difference
Mean backward packets
STD backward packets
Mean forward TTL value
Minimum forward packet
Minimum backward packet
Maximum forward packet
Maximum backward packet
# Total packets
Minimum packet size
Maximum packet size
Mean packet size
Packet size variance
(a) common features
TCP initial window size
TCP window scaling factor
# SSL compression methods
# SSL extension count
# SSL chiper methods
SSL session ID len
Forward peak MAX throughput
Mean throughput of backward peaks
Max throughput of backward peaks
Backward min peak throughput
Backward STD peak throughput
Forward number of bursts
Backward number of bursts
Forward min peak throughput
Mean throughput of forward peaks
Forward STD peak throughput
Mean backward peak inter arrival time diff
Minimum backward peak inter arrival time diff
Maximum backward peak inter arrival time diff
STD backward peak inter arrival time diff
Mean forward peak inter arrival time diff
Minimum forward peak inter arrival time diff
Maximum forward peak inter arrival time diff
STD forward peak inter arrival time diff
# Keep alive packets
TCP Maxiumu Segment Size
Forward SSL Version
(b) new features
TABLE I: The common features which are features that
are used in many traffic classification methods and the new
features which are proposed in this paper.
C. Learning
In this section we describe our machine learning methodol-
ogy. Supervised classification learning methods learn a clas-
sification function from a set of pre-labeled examples. The
classification function is then used for classifying unseen test
examples. There are two types of supervised classification
learning methods. Lazy learning algorithms store the training
Common Feature Set a typical feature set (presented in Table Ia), used
in many traffic classification methods [36]–[41],
[61]
Peaks Feature Set Only the bursty behavior of the browsers
New Feature Set A new set of features (presented in Table Ib),
based on a comprehensive network traffic anal-
ysis, in which we tried to identify traffic param-
eters that differentiate between different operat-
ing systems and browsers. The set of features
include new SSL features, new TCP features
and the bursty behavior of the browsers (peaks)
which is defined as a section of traffic where
there is silence before and after.
Common Stats Fea-
ture Set
Only statistics parameters from Table Ia
Statistics Only statistics parameters from Tables Ia, Ib
Combined Feature
Set
All available features combined (all the sets
above)
Combined no peaks
Feature Set
All available features combined minus the peak
features
Combined no SSL
Feature Set
All available features combined minus SSL re-
lated features
Combined no TCP
Feature Set
All available features combined minus TCP pro-
tocol related features
TABLE II: Feature Sets
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Fig. 2: An example of the bursty behavior of browser traffic.
data as is and then apply a classification function on a new
test example where the classification function is parameterized
with the pre-labeled training examples. Eager learning algo-
rithms, on the other hand, carry out a learning process on the
pre-labeled training examples. Eager learning algorithms often
perform better as the offline learning stage increases robustness
to noise.
The lazy machine learning algorithm we adapt is the nearest
neighbor algorithm [78]. In this algorithm, the classification
function computes similarities between a new test sample to
all pre-labeled examples. The test sample is then assigned to
the class of the most similar example from the training data.
The first eager machine learning algorithm we adapt is the
Support Vector Machine (SVM) [79]. A binary linear SVM
models training examples as points in space, and then divides
the space using a hyperplane to give the best separation among
the two classes. We used the LIBSVM package [80] which
uses the one-vs-one multiclass scheme. We used three versions
of the SVM:
• SVM+RBF - SVM with Radial Basis Function (RBF) as
the kernel function.
• SVM+SIM - SVM with threshold similarities to training
5samples as features [81]. Similarity is bounded by a
threshold. This is a heuristic based on the assumption
that dissimilar samples add noise rather than information.
The threshold similarity value and the distance function
are part of the cross-validation process.
u, v ∈ samples, 1−
min(distance(u, v), threshold)
threshold
• SVM+MAP - SVM with modified RBF similarities as
features [81] where the similarity is the same as in the
RBF function except for the distance function which is
not necessarily squared euclidean. The distance function
and gamma value are part of the cross-validation process.
u, v ∈ samples, exp(−γ · distance(u, v))
Our second eager machine learning algorithm we adapt is
the Random Forest algorithm [82], [83]. The Random Forest
algorithm grows multiple trees by randomly selecting subsets
of features. That is, trees are constructed in random subspaces
[82], [83].
Therefore, we have five machine learning algorithms. We
fine-tune the hyper-parameters of our machine learning algo-
rithms through grid search procedure combined with 5-fold
cross validation over the training set. For all machine learning
algorithms, features were scaled between zero and one at
training and the same scaling factors were used for the test
set.
For the KNN algorithm, we used cross validation for choos-
ing both the number of neighbors over the set {4, 6, . . . , 20},
uniform or distance-based weights and the distance measures:
Euclidean, Manhattan, Chebyshev, Hamming and Canberra.
For the SVM algorithm, we used cross validation for choosing
both the regularization parameter of SVM, C, over the set
{2−5, 2−3, . . . , 215} and for the gamma parameter of RBF,
over the set {2−15, 2−13, . . . , 23}. We used LIBSVM [80] to
train and test our dataset. For the Random Forest algorithm
we used cross validation for choosing the number of trees over
the set {20, 40, . . . , 120}.
IV. RESULTS
We trained and tested on 70% train and 30% test splits
five times and accuracy is reported as the average of these
experiments. We first show that the accuracy of the tuple
and its elements (Os, Browser, Application) is high. Then, we
wanted show the robustness of our system, by taking samples
(training and test) limited by time (the first x seconds/minutes
of the sessions). Afterward, we show that the training and
testing time is low (test time of millisecond).
In order to show resilience of the system, we show that
even when the training set is small we achieve high accuracy
and even if we use Virtual Private Network (VPN) or change
the cipher suite of the browser, our system still achieves high
accuracy.
The accuracy for the tuple <OS, Browser, Application>
classification with the nine feature sets is presented in Figure
3. There are three main observations: First, the tuple <OS,
Browser, Application> classification of encrypted classifica-
tion is possible with high accuracy. Second, using our new
features the results are comparable. Finally, in all experiments,
using our base + new features achieved the best results where
the Random Forest algorithm and SVM+MAP both achieved
the highest accuracy.
For tuple classification, the addition of our new features
increased accuracy from 93.52% to 96.06%. Confusion matrix
for the tuple accuracy is shown in Fig 4. As above, it can be
seen that the classification is almost perfect where most of the
mistakes are due to the unidentified label which can actually
be a correct answer that we could not verify.
We wanted to investigate if our system achieve high accu-
racy in case of limited session time which means less data
in each session. Therefore, in the next experiments we built
training and test set from our session using up to X sec-
onds/minutes (1 second, 10 seconds, 1 minutes, 10 minutes).
From Figure 5 we can see that the accuracy decreased but it
still high (close to 94%). Moreover, it is interesting to see that
the influence of shorting the session decrease after 1 minutes
of session, where the results of 1 minutes are close to the
accuracy of 1 second.
After understanding that using short sessions does not have
high effect on the results, we wanted to investigate the running
time of the training and testing. From Figure 6, we can see
that the training time of our algorithms is between 10 seconds
(RF) to 300 seconds (SVM) while the running time of the
testing is less than 1 seconds which means that our testing
algorithms can run on real time networks, as the streaming
running time is much higher.
We wanted to see what is the influence of the training data
set size. Therefore, we ran an experiment with various training
set size (between 50 samples to full data set, 14,443 = 0.7×
20,000 samples). From Figure 7, we can see that although
the training set had less samples, the system still reach a
reasonable accuracy of 80% for the baseline features and 85%
when the new features were added.
We discuss the effectiveness of our system against adversar-
ial opponents [84]. In this case, the opponent (maybe a user
who wants to protect his privacy or an attacker who wants
to avoid governments monitoring) will try to cause machine
learning to fail by changing the network traffic (e.g. using
VPN) or the protocols parameters (e.g. using different set of
cipher suites). Note that, the opponent may change his traffic
while testing time and not in training. The influence of using
VPN can be seen in Figure 8. Although the opponent aggregate
all the sessions together, our system is still able to classified
in good accuracy (81%) the operation system and the browser.
From the figure, we can see that the OS classification has better
performance than Browser and OS+Browser where the peaks
set gets very low results (30% accuracy). Classifying only the
browser, we achieved best performance using SVM+MAP or
SVM+SIM with Combined no peaks feature set. Most other
combinations have relatively low performance. Classifying
both OS and Browser, the best performance is achieved
using the SVM+MAP with combined as the set. Most other
combinations have relatively low performance.
Fig. 9 showed the influence on the accuracy of an attacker
that change the cipher suites (SSL parameter). Although the
opponent change in the SSL header the number and the vlaue
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Fig. 3: Accuracy results for KNN, SVM-RBF, SVM-MAP, SVM-SIM, RF with different features sets. This work is the first to
show that the tuple <OS, Browser, Application> classification is possible with high accuracy. Note that, naive classification
based on the data set statistics will have only 32.34% accuracy (by classifying all sessions as <Windows, IExplorer, Twitter>,
see Fig. 1). Adding our new features increased the accuracy to 96.6%.
of the cipher suites, our system is still able to classified in good
accuracy (91%) the operation system and the browser. From
the figure, we can see that the OS classification has better
performance than Browser and OS+Browser where the peaks
set gets very low results (65% accuracy). Classifying only the
browser, we achieved best performance RF with Combined no
peaks feature set. Classifying both OS and Browser, the best
performance is achieved using the RF with combined as the
set.
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Windows IExplorer Twitter 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ubuntu Firefox Google-Services 0 .97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Windows Non-Browser Microsoft-Services 0 0 .99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Windows Chrome Twitter 0 0 0 .99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Windows Firefox Twitter 0 0 0 0 .98 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .02 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OSX Safari Google-Services 0 0 0 0 0 .92 .04 0 0 0 .02 0 0 0 0 .02 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OSX Safari Youtube 0 0 0 0 0 .02 .97 .01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ubuntu Chrome Unidentified 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .84 0 0 0 0 .07 .04 0 0 0 0 .01 0 0 .03 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Windows Chrome Google-Services 0 0 .01 .03 0 0 0 0 .94 0 0 0 0 0 .02 0 0 0 0 0 .01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ubuntu Firefox Twitter 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .95 0 .03 0 0 0 0 .01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OSX Safari Unidentified 0 0 0 0 0 .06 .01 0 0 0 .91 0 0 0 0 .01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ubuntu Firefox Unidentified 0 .02 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .08 0 .87 0 0 0 0 .01 0 0 0 0 0 0 .03 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ubuntu Chrome Google-Services 0 .07 0 0 0 0 0 .18 0 0 0 0 .73 0 0 0 0 0 .02 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ubuntu Chrome Twitter 0 .02 0 0 0 0 0 .08 0 0 0 0 .03 .84 0 0 0 0 .01 0 0 .01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Windows Firefox Google-Services 0 0 0 .01 0 0 0 0 .01 0 0 0 0 0 .97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OSX Safari Twitter 0 0 0 0 0 0 .06 0 0 0 .03 0 0 0 0 .91 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ubuntu Firefox Youtube 0 .02 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .02 0 .02 0 0 0 0 .93 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Windows Non-Browser Teamviewer 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ubuntu Chrome Youtube 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .07 0 0 0 0 .13 .04 0 0 0 0 .74 0 0 .02 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Windows Non-Browser Dropbox 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Windows Chrome Unidentified 0 0 .02 .09 0 0 0 0 .02 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ubuntu Chrome Facebook 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .3 0 0 0 0 .04 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .67 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Windows Firefox Unidentified 0 0 .06 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .94 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ubuntu Firefox Facebook 0 .06 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .11 0 .28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .56 0 0 0 0 0 0
OSX Chrome Twitter 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .75 0 0 0 .06 .06
Windows IExplorer Unidentified .71 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .29 0 0 0 0
Ubuntu Non-Browser Skype 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Windows IExplorer Google-Services 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
OSX Chrome Google-Services 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
OSX Chrome Unidentified 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Fig. 4: Confusion matrix (rows are ground truth). For most tuples the classification is almost perfect. Exceptions happens
mostly between similar tuples and the Unidentified classes (which can actually be a correct answer that we could not verify).
For example, “Ubuntu Chrome Google-Services” is mistakenly classified as “Ubuntu Chrome Unidentified” in 18% of the
cases and “Ubuntu Firefox Google-Services” in 7%.
V. POSSIBLE COUNTERMEASURES AND LIMITATIONS
Although, users and service providers might believe that if
they use the right encryption and authentication mechanisms
their communications are secure, there are still limitations. As
presented in this paper, it possible to develop classifiers for
TLS/SSL encrypted traffic that are able to discriminate be-
tween Operating Systems, Browsers and Applications. While
it is out of the scope of the paper to investigate all possible
countermeasures to the proposed attack, we discuss in the
following some related issues.
In the results section, we showed that changing cipher suites
and using VPNs as counter measures at test time reduced
accuracy, but still our proposed attack was able to identify
the information with reasonable accuracy.
Another simple countermeasures are padding techniques
which may be effective against traffic analysis approaches.
However, it has to be considered that padding countermeasures
are already standardized in TLS, explicitly to frustrate attacks
on a protocol that are based on analysis of the lengths of
exchanged messages [6].The intuition is that the information
is not hidden efficiently, and the analysis of these features may
still allow analysis.
Based on the results, we strongly believe that it is not trivial
to propose effective countermeasures to the attack we showed
in this paper. Indeed, it is the intention of the authors to
highlight a problem that is becoming even more alarming after
the revelation about the mass surveillance programs that are
nowadays adopted by governments and nation states.
In our opinion, the main limitation of our approach is
related to the usage of supervised learning algorithms. It has
to be considered that this technique is generally more efficient
than the unsupervised learning since it takes advantage of the
knowledge of each class of interest. However, it has two main
drawbacks: (1) The training dataset has to be labeled with the
intervention of a human, (2) It is not possible to recognize
classes of events that have not been used during the training
phase. (3) Upgrades might change traffic patterns.
We mitigated the first limitation using an automatic ap-
proach to label the network traces collected for the training
phase. However, the second limitation cannot be addressed
without revising the entire approach.
In order to mitigate the third limitation we did the following:
(1) We connect our lab to a VPN network which add another
layer of encryption (2) We changed the cipher suites number
and values of the browsers. In both cases we use the same
classifiers where we focus on classifying operating system and
browser. From Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 we can see that in both cases
there is some effect on the results, however, the accuracy is
still high.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The framework proposed in this paper is able to classify
encrypted network traffic and to infer which operating system,
browser and application the user is using on his desktop or lap-
top computer. We showed that despite the use of SSL/TLS, our
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Fig. 5: Real time Tuple classification of a short period of a session (1 seconds, 10 seconds, 1 minute and 10 minutes) using
KNN, SVM-RBF, SVM-MAP, SVM-SIM, RF classification algorithms
traffic analysis approach is an effective tool. An eavesdropper
can easily leverage the information about the user to fit an
optimal attack vector.
A passive adversary may also collect statistics about groups
of users for improving their marketing strategy. In addition,
an attacker may use tuples statistics for identifying a specific
person.
An interesting extension of this work would be to add
action classification (e.g. send a tweet, receive a post) to the
tuple as has been done for application and action for mobile
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Fig. 6: Training (including cross validation) and testing time of the machine learning algorithms for various training dataset
sizes. The x-axis is in logarithmic scale.
devices [8]. Another interesting extension would be to identify
operating system and browser also in the mobile world.
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